Developing Autonomic Properties for Distributed Pattern-Recognition
  Systems with ASSL: A Distributed MARF Case Study by Vassev, Emil & Mokhov, Serguei A.
Developing Autonomic Properties for
Distributed Pattern-Recognition Systems with
ASSL: A Distributed MARF Case Study ∗
Emil Vassev
Lero - the Irish Software Engineering Research Centre
University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland
emil@vassev.com
Serguei A. Mokhov
Faculty of Engineering and Computer Science, Concordia University
1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd. W, Montreal, QC, Canada
mokhov@cse.concordia.ca
Abstract
In this paper, we discuss our research towards developing special properties that in-
troduce autonomic behavior in pattern-recognition systems. In our approach we use
ASSL (Autonomic System Specification Language) to formally develop such properties for
DMARF (Distributed Modular Audio Recognition Framework). These properties enhance
DMARF with an autonomic middleware that manages the four stages of the framework’s
pattern-recognition pipeline. DMARF is a biologically inspired system employing pattern
recognition, signal processing, and natural language processing helping us process audio,
textual, or imagery data needed by a variety of scientific applications, e.g., biometric appli-
cations. In that context, the notion go autonomic DMARF (ADMARF) can be employed
by autonomous and robotic systems that theoretically require less-to-none human inter-
vention other than data collection for pattern analysis and observing the results. In this
article, we explain the ASSL specification models for the autonomic properties of DMARF.
Keywords: autonomic computing, formal methods, ASSL, DMARF
1 Introduction
Today, we face the challenge of hardware and software complexity that appears to be the biggest
threat to the continuous progress in IT. Many initiatives towards complexity reduction in both
software and hardware have arisen with the advent of new theories and paradigms. Autonomic
computing (AC) [13] promises reduction of the workload needed to maintain complex systems by
transforming them into self-managing autonomic systems. The AC paradigm draws inspiration
from the human body’s autonomic nervous system [3]. The idea is that software systems
can manage themselves and deal with dynamic requirements, as well as unanticipated threats,
automatically, just as the body does, by handling complexity through self-management.
Pattern recognition is a widely used biologically inspired technique in the modern computer
science. Algorithms for image and voice recognition have been derived from the human brain,
which uses pattern recognition to recognize shapes, images, voices, sounds, etc. In this research,
we applied the principles of AC to solve specific problems in distributed pattern-recognition sys-
tems, such as availability, security, performance, etc. where the health of a distributed pipeline
∗This work was supported in part by an IRCSET postdoctoral fellowship grant (now termed as EMPOWER)
at University College Dublin, Ireland, by the Science Foundation Ireland grant 03/CE2/I303 1 to Lero (the Irish
Software Engineering Research Centre), and by the Faculty of Engineering and Computer Science of Concordia
University, Montreal, Canada.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
11
2.
39
72
v1
  [
cs
.D
C]
  1
6 D
ec
 20
11
Autonomic Specification of Pattern-Recognition Systems with ASSL Vassev and Mokhov
is important. We tackled these issues by introducing self-management into the system behav-
ior. As a proof-of-concept (PoC) case study, we used ASSL [18, 25] to develop the autonomic
self-management properties for DMARF [10], which is an intrinsically complex pipelined dis-
tributed system composed of multi-level operational layers. The ASSL framework helped us
develop the self-managing features first, which we then integrated into DMARF. In this paper,
based on our results, we provide an attempt to generalize our experience on any similar-scale
distributed pipelined pattern-recognition system.
1.1 Problem Statement and Proposed Solution
Distributed MARF (DMARF) could not be used in autonomous systems of any kind as-is
due to lack of provision for such a use by applications that necessitate the self-management
requirements. Extending DMARF directly to support the said requirements is a major redesign
and development effort to undertake for an open-source project. Moreover, such and extended
autonomic DMARF must be validated and tested, since there is no immediate guarantee that
the properties the latter has been augmented with are intrinsically correct.
In our approach, we provide the methodology for the initial proof-of-concept. We spec-
ify with ASSL a number of autonomic properties for DMARF, such as self-healing [24], self-
optimization [23], and self-protection [12]. The implementation of those properties is generated
automatically by the ASSL framework in the form of a special wrapper Java code that pro-
vides an autonomic layer implementing the DMARF’s autonomic properties. In addition, the
latter are formally validated with the ASSL’s mechanisms for consistency and model checking.
Model checking is performed on the generated Java code, where the ASSL relies on the Java
PathFinder [2] tool developed by NASA Ames.
1.2 Organization
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the field of
autonomic computing and describe both ASSL and DMARF frameworks. Section 3 presents
details of the ASSL specification models for autonomic properties of DMARF. Finally, Section 4
presents some concluding remarks and future work.
2 Background
The vision and metaphor of AC [13] is to apply the principles of self-regulation and complexity
hiding. The AC paradigm emphasizes reduction of the workload needed to maintain com-
plex systems by transforming those into self-managing autonomic systems (AS). The idea is
that software systems shall automatically manage themselves just as the human body does.
Nowadays, a great deal of research effort is devoted to developing AC tools. Such a tool is the
ASSL framework, which helps AC developers with problem specification, system design, system
analysis and evaluation, and system implementation.
ASSL was initially developed by Vassev at Concordia University, Montreal, Canada [25] and
since then it has been successfully applied to the development of a variety of autonomic systems
including distributed ones. For example, ASSL was used to develop autonomic features and
generate prototype models for two NASA missions – the ANTS (Autonomous Nano-Technology
Swarm) concept mission (where a thousand of picospacecraft work cooperatively to explore the
asteroid belt [17]), and the Voyager mission [16]. In both cases, there have been developed au-
tonomic prototypes to simulate the autonomic properties of the space exploration missions and
2
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validate those properties through the simulated experimental results. The targeted autonomic
properties were: self-configuring [22], self-healing [19], and self-scheduling [21] for ANTS, and
autonomic image processing for Voyager [20]. In general, the development of these properties
required a two-level approach, i.e., they were specified at the individual spacecraft level and at
the level of the entire system. Because ANTS is intrinsically distributed system composed of
many autonomous spacecraft, that case study required individual specification of the autonomic
properties of each individual spacecraft member of the ANTS swarm.
2.1 ASSL
The Autonomic System Specification Language (ASSL) [18, 25] approaches the problem of
formal specification and code generation of autonomic systems (ASs) within a framework. The
core of this framework is a special formal notation and a toolset including tools that allow
ASSL specifications be edited and validated. The current validation approach in ASSL is a
form of consistency checking (handles syntax and consistency errors) performed against a set
of semantic definitions. The latter form a theory that aids in the construction of correct AS
specifications. Moreover, from any valid specification, ASSL can generate an operational Java
application skeleton.
Overall, ASSL considers autonomic systems (ASs) as composed of autonomic elements (AEs)
communicating over interaction protocols. To specify those, ASSL is defined through formaliza-
tion of tiers. Over these tiers, ASSL provides a multi-tier specification model that is designed
to be scalable and exposes a judicious selection and configuration of infrastructure elements and
mechanisms needed by an AS. The ASSL tiers and their sub-tiers (see Figure 1) are abstractions
of different aspects of the AS under consideration. They aid not only to specification of the
system at different levels of abstraction, but also to reduction of the complexity, and thus, to
improving the overall perception of the system.
There are three major tiers (three major abstraction perspectives), each composed of sub-
tiers (see Figure 1):
• AS tier – presents a general and global AS perspective, where we define the general
autonomic system rules in terms of service-level objectives (SLO) and self-management
policies, architecture topology and global actions, events and metrics applied in these rules.
• AS Interaction Protocol (ASIP) tier – forms a communication protocol perspective, where
we define the means of communication between AEs. An ASIP is composed of channels,
communication functions, and messages.
• AE tier – forms a unit-level perspective, where we define interacting sets of individual AEs
with their own behavior. This tier is composed of AE rules (SLO and self-management
policies), an AE interaction protocol (AEIP), AE friends (a list of AEs forming a circle of
trust), recovery protocols, special behavior models and outcomes, AE actions, AE events,
and AE metrics.
The AS Tier specifies an AS in terms of service-level objectives (AS SLOs), self-management
policies, architecture topology, actions, events, and metrics (see Figure 1). The AS SLOs are a
high-level form of behavioral specification that help developers establish system objectives (e.g.,
performance). The self-management policies could be any of (but not restricted to) the four
so-called self-CHOP policies defined by the AC IBM blueprint: self-configuring, self-healing,
self-optimizing and self-protecting [4]. These policies are event-driven and trigger the execution
of actions driving an AS in critical situations. The metrics constitute a set of parameters and
3
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I. Autonomic System (AS)
* AS Service-level Objectives
* AS Self-managing Policies
* AS Architecture
* AS Actions
* AS Events
* AS Metrics
II. AS Interaction Protocol (ASIP)
* AS Messages
* AS Communication Channels
* AS Communication Functions
III. Autonomic Element (AE)
* AE Service-level Objectives
* AE Self-managing Policies
* AE Friends
* AE Interaction Protocol (AEIP)
- AE Messages
- AE Communication Channels
- AE Communication Functions
- AE Managed Elements
* AE Recovery Protocol
* AE Behavior Models
* AE Outcomes
* AE Actions
* AE Events
* AE Metrics
Figure 1: ASSL Multi-Tier Model
observables controllable by an AS. At the ASIP Tier, the ASSL framework helps developers
specify an AS-level interaction protocol as a public communication interface, expressed with
special communication channels, communication functions and communication messages. At
the AE Tier, the ASSL formal model exposes specification constructs for the specification of
the system’s AEs.
Conceptually, AEs are considered to be analogous to software agents able to manage their
own behavior and their relationships with other AEs. These relationships are specified at both
ASIP and AEIP tiers. Whereas ASIP specifies an AS-level interaction protocol that is public
and accessible to all the AEs of an AS and to external systems communicating with that very
AS, the AEIP tier is normally used to specify a private communication protocol used by an AE
to communicate only with: 1) trusted AEs, i.e., AEs declared as “AE Friends” (see Figure 1);
and 2) special controlled managed elements. Therefore, two AEs exchange messages over an
AEIP only if they are friends, thus revealing the need for special negotiation messages specified
at ASIP to discover new friends at runtime.
Note that ASSL targets only the AC features of a system and helps developers clearly distin-
guish the AC features from the system-service features. This is possible, because with ASSL we
model and generate special AC wrappers in the form of ASs that embed the components of non-
AC systems. The latter are considered as managed elements, controlled by the AS in question.
A managed element can be any software or hardware system (or sub-system) providing services.
Managed elements are specified per AE (they form an extra layer at the AEIP see Figure 1)
where the emphasis is on the control interface. It is important also to mention that the ASSL
tiers and sub-tiers are intended to specify different aspects of an AS, but it is not necessary to
employ all of them in order to model such a system. For a simple AS we need to specify 1)
the AEs providing self-managing behavior intended to control the managed elements associated
with an AE; and 2) the communication interface. Here, self-management policies must be spec-
ified to provide such self-managing behavior at the level of AS (the AS Tier) and at the level of
AE (AE Tier). The self-management behavior of an ASSL-developed AS is specified with the
4
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ASSELF MANAGEMENT {
SELF HEALING {
FLUENT inLosingSpacecraft {
INITIATED_BY { EVENTS.spaceCraftLost }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.earthNotified }
}
MAPPING {
CONDITIONS { inLosingSpacecraft }
DO_ACTIONS { ACTIONS.notifyEarth }
}
}
} // ASSELF MANAGEMENT
Figure 2: Self-management Policy
self-management policies. These policies are specified with special ASSL constructs termed flu-
ents and mappings [18, 25]. A fluent is a state where an AS enters with fluent-activating events
and exits with fluent-terminating events. A mapping connects fluents with particular actions to
be undertaken. Usually, an ASSL specification is built around self-management policies, which
make that specification AC-driven. The policies themselves are driven by events and actions
determined deterministically. Figure 2 presents a sample specification of an ASSL self-healing
policy.
For more details on the ASSL multi-tier specification model and the ASSL framework toolset,
please refer to [18, 25].
2.2 Distributed MARF
DMARF [10] is based on the classical MARF whose pipeline stages were made into distributed
nodes. The Modular Audio Recognition Framework (MARF) [5] is an open-source research
platform and a collection of pattern recognition, signal processing, and natural language pro-
cessing (NLP) algorithms written in Java and arranged into a modular and extensible framework
facilitating addition of new algorithms for use and experiments by scientists. MARF can run
distributively over the network, run stand-alone, or may just act as a library in applications.
MARF has a number of algorithms implemented for various pattern recognition and some signal
processing tasks. The backbone of MARF consists of pipeline stages that communicate with
each other to get the data they need in a chained manner.
In general, MARF’s pipeline of algorithm implementations is presented in Figure 3 (where
the implemented algorithms are grouped in white boxes, and the stubs or in progress algorithms
are grouped in gray). The pipeline consists of the four core stages grouping the similar kinds
of algorithms: (1) sample loading, (2) preprocessing, (3) feature extraction, and (4) training/-
classification. MARF’s distributed extension, DMARF [10] allows the stages of the pipeline
to run as distributed nodes as well as a front-end. The basic stages and the front-end were
implemented without backup recovery or hot-swappable capabilities at this point; just commu-
nication over Java RMI [26], CORBA [14], and XML-RPC WebServices [15]. There is also an
undergoing project on the intensional scripting language, MARFL [7] to allow scripting MARF
tasks and applications.
There are various applications that test and employ MARF’s functionality and serve as
examples of how to use MARF. High-volume processing of recorded audio, textual, or imagery
data are possible pattern-recognition and biometric applications of DMARF. In this work, most
of the emphasis is on audio processing, such as conference recordings with purpose of attribution
of said material to identities of speakers. Another emphasis is on processing a bulk of recorded
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Figure 3: MARF’s Pattern Recognition Pipeline
phone conversations in a police department for forensic analysis [8] and subject identification
and classification. See the cited works and references therein for more details on MARF and
applications.
3 Making Distributed Pipelined Systems Autonomic with
ASSL: Autonomic DMARF Case Study
In general, ASSL helps to design and generate special autonomic wrappers in the form of AEs
that embed one or more system components. The latter are considered as managed elements
(see Section 2.1) that present one or more single nodes of a distributed system. Therefore, for
each distributed node, we ideally specify with ASSL a single AE that introduces an autonomic
behavior to that node. All the AEs are specified at the AE Tier and the global autonomic be-
havior of the entire system is handled by specifications at the AS Tier (see Figure 1). As shown
in Section 2.1, we rely on a rich set of constructs, such as actions, events, and metrics to specify
special self-management policies driving the nodes of a distributed system in situations requir-
ing autonomic behavior. Moreover, with ASSL, we specify special interaction protocols (ASIP
and AEIP) that help those nodes exchange messages and synchronize on common autonomic
behavior. In this section we demonstrate how ASSL may be applied to an inherently distributed
system such as DMARF. The novelty in our approach is safeguarding the distributed pipeline,
which is not possible with plain distributed systems. Therefore, with this case study we not
only demonstrate the applicability of ASSL to distributed systems but also validate that ASSL
may successfully be applied to pipelined distributed systems.
DMARF’s capture as an AS primarily covers the autonomic behavior of the distributed
pattern-recognition pipeline. We examine properties that apply to DMARF and specify in
6
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detail the self-CHOP aspects of it. If we look a the DMARF pipeline as a whole, we see that
there should be at least one instance of every stage somewhere on the network. There are four
main core pipeline stages and an application-specific stage that initiates pipeline processing. If
one of the core stages goes offline, the pipeline stalls and to recover it has the following options:
1) use of a replacement node; 2) recovery of the failed node; or 3) rerouting the pipeline through
a different node with the same service functionality as the failed one.
In order to make DMARF autonomic, we need to add automicity (autonomic computing be-
havior) to the DMARF behavior. We add a special autonomic manager (AM) to each DMARF
stage. This makes the latter AEs, those composing an autonomic DMARF (ADMARF ) capable
of self-management.
3.1 Self-Healing
A DMARF-based system should be able to recover itself through replication to keep at least
one route of the pipeline available. There are two types of replication: 1) the replication of
a service, which essentially means that we increase the number of nodes per core stage (e.g.
two different hosts provide preprocessing services as active replication, so if one goes down, the
pipeline is still not stalled; if both are up they can contribute to load balancing, which is a part
of the self-optimization autonomic property); and 2) replication within the node itself. If all
nodes of a core stages go down, the stage preceding it is responsible to start up a temporary one
on the host of the preceding stage, set it up to repair the pipeline. This is the hard replication
needed to withstand stall faults, where it is more vulnerable and not fault-tolerant. In the
second case, denoting passive replication of the same node (or even different nodes) losing a
primary or a replica is not as serious as in the first case because such a loss does not produce
a pipeline stall and it is easier to self-heal after a passive replica loss. Restart and recovery of
the failed node without replicas is another possibility for self-healing for DMARF. Technically,
it may be tried prior or after the replica kicks in.
In the course of this project, we used ASSL to specify the self-healing behavior of ADMARF
by addressing specific cases related to node replacement (service replica) and node recovery,
shown in Figure 4.
The following sub-sections describe the ASSL specification of the self-healing algorithm
revealed here. We specified this algorithm as an ASSL self-healing policy spread on both
system (AS tier) and autonomic element (AE tier) levels where events, actions, metrics, and
special managed element interface functions are used to incorporate the self-healing behavior in
ADMARF (see Appendix A). Note that due to space limitations Appendix A presents a partial
ASSL specification where only one AE (DMARF stage) is specified. The full specification
specifies all the four DMARF stages.
3.1.1 AS Tier Specification for Self-Healing
At the AS tier we specify the global ADMARF self-healing behavior. To specify the latter, we
use an ASSL SELF_HEALING self-management policy (see Figure 5). Here we specified a single
fluent mapped to an action via a mapping.
Thus, the inLowPerformance fluent is initiated by a lowPerformanceDetected event and
terminated by one of the events such as performanceNormalized or performanceNormFailed.
Here the inLowPerformance event is activated when special AS-level performance service-
level objectives (SLO) degrade (see Figure 6). Note that in ASSL, SLO are evaluated as
Booleans based on their satisfaction and thus, they can be evaluated as degraded or normal [25].
Therefore, in our specification model, the lowPerformanceDetected event is activated anytime
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1 ADMARF monitors its run-time performance and in case of performance degradation
notifies the problematic DMARF stages to start self-healing;
2 Every notified DMARF stage (note that this is an AE) analyzes the problem locally to
determine its nature: a node is down or a node is not healthy (does not perform well);
3 if A node is down then
// The following node-replacement algorithm is followed by the AM of
the stage:
4 AM strives to find a replica note of the failed one;
5 if replica found then
6 next redirect computation to it;
7 end
8 if replica not found then
9 report the problem. Note that the algorithm could be extended with a few more
steps where the AM contacts the AM of the previous stage to organize pipeline
reparation;
10 end
11 end
12 if A node does not perform well then
// The following node-recovery algorithm is followed:
13 AM starts the recovery protocol for the problematic node;
14 if recovery successful then
15 do nothing;
16 end
17 if recovery unsuccessful then
18 AM strives to find a replica node of the failed one;
19 end
20 if replica found then
21 next redirect computation to it;
22 end
23 if replica not found then
24 report the problem;
25 end
26 end
Figure 4: DMARF Self-Healing Algorithm
when the ADMARF’s performance goes down. Alternatively, the performanceNormalized
event activates when the same performance goes up.
As specified, the AS-level performance SLO are a global task whose realization is dis-
tributed among the AEs (DMARF stages). Thus, the AS-level performance degrades when the
performance of any of the DMARF stages goes down (see the FOREACH loop in Figure 6), thus
triggering the SELF_HEALING policy. In addition, the performanceNormFailed event activates
if an a special event (selfHealingFailed) occurs in the system. This event is specified at the
AE tier (see Section 3.1.2) and reports that the local AE-level self-healing has failed. Although
not presented in this specification, the performanceNormFailed event should be activated by
any of the performanceNormFailed events specified for each AE (a DMARF stage).
Moreover, once the inLowPerformance fluent gets initiated, the corresponding startSelfHealing
8
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ASSELF MANAGEMENT {
SELF HEALING {
// a performance problem has been detected
FLUENT inLowPerformance {
INITIATED BY { EVENTS.lowPerformanceDetected }
TERMINATED BY { EVENTS.performanceNormalized,
EVENTS.performanceNormFailed }
}
MAPPING {
CONDITIONS { inLowPerformance }
DO ACTIONS { ACTIONS.startSelfHealing }
}
}
} // ASSELF MANAGEMENT
Figure 5: AS Tier SELF HEALING Policy
ASSLO {
SLO performance {
FOREACH member in AES {
member.AESLO.performance
}
}
}
....
EVENTS { // these events are used in the fluents specification
EVENT lowPerformanceDetected {
ACTIVATION { DEGRADED { ASSLO.performance } } }
EVENT performanceNormalized {
ACTIVATION { NORMALIZED { ASSLO.performance } } }
EVENT performanceNormFailed {
ACTIVATION {
OCCURRED { AES.STAGE_AE.EVENTS.selfHealingFailed } } }
} // EVENTS
Figure 6: AS Tier SLO and Events
action is executed (see Figure 6). This action simply triggers an AE-level event if the perfor-
mance of that AE is degraded. The AE-level event prompts the SELF_HEALING policy at the
AE level (see Section 3.1.2).
3.1.2 AE Tier Specification for Self-Healing
At this tier we specify the self-healing policy for each AE in the ADMARF AS. Recall that the
ADMARF ’s AEs are the DMARF stages enriched with a special autonomic manager each.
Appendix A presents the self-healing specification of one AE called STAGE_AE. Note that
the latter can be considered as a generic AE and the specifications of the four AEs (one
per DMARF stage) can be derived from this one. Similar to the AS-level specification (see
Section 3.1.1), here we specify a (but AE-level) SELF_HEALING policy with a set of fluents
initiated and terminated by events and actions mapped to those fluents (see Appendix A).
Thus we specified three distinct fluents: inActiveSelfHealing, inFailedNodesDetec-ted,
and inProblematicNodesDetected, each mapped to an AE-level action. The first fluent gets
initiated when a mustDoSelfHealing event occurs in the system. That event is triggered by
the AS-level startSelfHea-ling action in the case when the performance SLO of the AE get
degraded (see Appendix A).
Here the performance SLO of the AE are specified as a Boolean expression over two ASSL
9
Autonomic Specification of Pattern-Recognition Systems with ASSL Vassev and Mokhov
AESLO {
SLO performance {
METRICS.numberOfFailedNodes
AND
METRICS.numberOfProblematicNodes
}
}
Figure 7: AE Tier SLO
VALUE { 0 }
THRESHOLD CLASS { Integer [0] } // valid only when holds 0
Figure 8: AE Tier Metric Threshold Class
metrics, such as the numberOfFailedNodes metric and the equivalent numberOfProblematicNodes
(see Figure 7). Whereas the former measures the number of failed notes in the DMARF stage,
the latter measures the number of problematic nodes in that stage.
Both metrics are specified as RESOURCE metrics, i.e., observing a managed resource controlled
by the AE [25]. Note that the managed resource is the DMARF stage itself. Thus, as those met-
rics are specified (see Appendix A) they get updated by the DMARF stage via special interface
functions embedded in the specification of a STAGE_ME managed element (see Appendix A). In
addition, both metrics are set to accept only a zero value (see Figure 8), thus set in the so-called
metric THRESHOLD_CLASS [25]. The latter determines rules for valid and invalid metric values.
Since in ASSL metrics are evaluated as Booleans (valid or invalid) based on the value they are
currently holding, the performance SLO (see Figure 7) gets degraded if one of the two defined
metrics, the numberOf-FailedNodes metric or the numberOfProblematicNodes metric become
invalid, i.e., if the DMARF stage reports that there is one or more failed or problematic nodes.
The inActiveSelfHealing fluent prompts the ana-lyzeProblem action execution (see Ap-
pendix A). The latter uses the STAGE_ME managed element’s interface functions to determine
the nature of the problem – is it a node that failed or it is a node that does not perform well.
Based on this, the action triggers a mustSwitch-ToNodeReplica event or a mustFixNode event
respectively. Each one of those events initiates a fluent in the AE SELF_HEALING policy to handle
the performance problem. The inFailedNodesDetected fluent handles the case when a node
has failed and its replica must be started and the inProblematicNodesDetected fluent handles
the case when a node must be recovered. Here the first fluent prompts the execution of the
start-ReplicaNode action and the second prompts the execution of the fixProblematicNode
action. Internally, both actions call interface functions of the STAGE_ME managed element. Note
that those functions trigger erroneous events if they do not succeed (see Figure 9). Those events
terminate fluents of the AE SELF_HEALING policy (see Appendix A).
It is important to mention that the inFailedNodes-Detected fluent gets initiated when
the mustSwitchTo-NodeReplica event occurs in the system. The latter is triggered by the
analyzeProblem action.
Moreover, the same event activates, according to its specification (see Figure 10), if a
nodeCannotBeFixed event occurs in the system, which is due to the inability of the recoverNode
interface function to recover the problematic node (see Figure 9). Therefore, if a node cannot be
recovered the inFailedNodesDetected fluent will be initiated in an attempt to start the replica
of that node. Note that this conforms to the self-healing algorithm presented in Section 3.
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// runs the replica of a failed node
INTERFACE_FUNCTION runNodeReplica {
PARAMETERS { DMARFNode node }
ONERR TRIGGERS { EVENTS.nodeReplicaFailed }
}
// recovers a problematic node
INTERFACE_FUNCTION recoverNode {
PARAMETERS { DMARFNode node }
ONERR TRIGGERS { EVENTS.nodeCannotBeFixed }
}
Figure 9: AE Tier STAGE ME Functions
EVENT mustSwitchToNodeReplica {
ACTIVATION {
OCCURRED { EVENTS.nodeCannotBeFixed }
}
}
Figure 10: Event mustSwitchToNodeReplica
3.2 ASSL Self-Protection Model for DMARF
For scientific and research computing on a local network in a controlled lab environment, runs of
DMARF do not need to be protected against malicious alteration or denial of service. However,
as soon as the researchers across universities need to cooperate (or police departments to share
the audio data recognition or computing), various needs about security and protection arise
about data and computation results integrity, confidentiality, and the fact they come from a
legitimate source. Therefore, self-protection of a DMARF-based system is less important in the
localized scientific environments, but is a lot more important in global environments ran over
the Internet, potentially through links crossing country borders. This is even more true if the
data being worked on by a DMARF installation are of a sensitive nature such as recordings
of the phone conversations of potential terrorist suspects. Thus, we point out the general
requirements for this autonomic property of DMARF:
• For the self-protection aspect, the DMARF-based systems should adhere to the specifica-
tion where each node proves its identity to other nodes participating in the pipeline as well
as passive replicas. This will insure the data origin authentication (the data are coming
from a legitimate source) and will protect against spoofing of the data with distorted voice
recordings or incorrect processed data at the later stages of the pipeline. Thus, we ensure
the trustworthiness of the distributed data being processed [6]. This can be achieved
by proxy certificates issued to the nodes during the deployment and management phase.
Each node digitally signs the outgoing data, with the signature the recipient node can
verify through the certificate of the sender signed by trusted authority. This is in a way
similar to how DNSSec [1] operates for the DNS names and servers by attaching a public
key to the host and IP pair signed by the higher-level domain or authority. The similar
trust mechanism is also important when DMARF is used for scientific research installa-
tion that say crosses the boundaries of several Universities’ network perimeters over the
Internet while performing scientific computation – the bottom line the data coming from
the pipeline stages should be trustworthy, i.e. correct.
• The same proxy certificates can also help with the data privacy along public channels,
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especially when identities of real people are involved, such as speakers, that cross the
Internet. The system should protect itself from any falsification attempt by detecting
it, halting the corresponding computation, and logging and reporting the incident in a
trustworthy manner.
• Run-time communication protocol selection is a self-protection option that ensures avail-
ability in case the default communication mechanism becomes unavailable (e.g. the de-
fault port of rmiregistry becomes blocked by a firewall) the participating nodes switch
to XML-RPC over HTTP. The protection of self against Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) is a difficult problem, which extends onto protecting not only self to the best
available means but also the self’s peers by avoiding flooding them by the self’s own out-
put of a compromised node. While the DDoS attacks are very difficult to mitigate if a
node is under attack, each node can protect self and others by limiting the amount of
outgoing traffic it, itself, produces when a compromise is suspected or too much traffic
flood is detected.
For self-protection, DMARF-based systems should adhere to the specification where each
node proves its identity to other nodes participating in the pipeline as well as passive replicas.
This will insure the data origin authentication (the data are coming from a legitimate source)
and will protect against spoofing of the data with distorted voice recordings or incorrect pro-
cessed data at the later stages of the pipeline. Thus, we ensure the trustworthiness of the
distributed data being processed [6]. This can be achieved by proxy certificates issued to the
nodes during the deployment and management phase. Each node digitally signs the outgoing
data, with the signature the recipient node can verify through the certificate of the sender signed
by trusted authority. This is in a way similar to how DNSSec [1] operates for the DNS names
and servers by attaching a public key to the host and IP pair signed by the higher-level domain
or authority. The same proxy certificates can also help with the data privacy along public
channels, especially when identities of real people are involved, such as speakers, that cross
the Internet. The system should protect itself from any falsification attempt by detecting it,
halting the corresponding computation, and logging and reporting the incident in a trustworthy
manner.
To provide self-protecting capabilities, DMARF has to incorporate special autonomic com-
puting behavior. To achieve that, similar to our related work on the self-healing and self-
optimization models for DMARF [23, 24], we add a special autonomic manager (AM) to each
DMARF stage. This converts the latter into AEs that compose the autonomic DMARF (AD-
MARF ) capable of self-management. Self-protecting is one of the self-management properties
that must be addressed by ADMARF . Here we use ASSL to specify the self-protecting be-
havior of ADMARF where incoming messages must be secure in order to be able to process
them. Thus, if a message (public or private) is about to be received in the AS, the following
self-protection algorithm is followed by the AM of the stage (AE level) for private messages or
by the global AM (AS level) for public messages:
• A message hook mechanism detects when a message (public or private) is about to be
received.
• AM strives to identify the sender of that message by checking the embedded digital
signature:
– If the message does not carry a digital signature then it is considered insecure.
– If the message carries a digital signature then its digital signature is checked:
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∗ If the digital signature is recognized then the message is considered secure.
∗ If the digital signature is not recognized then the message is considered insecure.
• If the message is secure no restrictions are imposed over the IO operations and the message
can be processed further.
• If the message is insecure the message is simply discarded by blocking any IO operations
over that message.
The following sections describe the DMARF specification of the self-protecting algorithm
revealed here. We specified this algorithm as an ASSL self-protecting policy spread on both
system (AS tier) and autonomic element (AE tier) levels where events, actions, metrics, and
special managed element interface functions are used to incorporate the self-protecting behavior
in ADMARF (see Appendix B). In addition, two interaction protocols – a public (ASIP tier)
and a private (AEIP tier), are specified to provide a secure communication system used by both
DMARF nodes and external entities to communicate. Note that due to space limitations Ap-
pendix B presents a partial ASSL specification where only one AE (DMARF stage) is specified.
The full specification specifies all the four DMARF stages.
3.2.1 IP Tiers Specification
Recall that ASSL specifies AEs as entities communicating via special interaction protocols (see
Section 2.1). Note that all the communication activities (sending and receiving messages),
all the communication channels, and all the communication entities (ASSL messages) must
be specified in order to allow both internal and external entities to communicate. Hence,
no entity can either send or receive a message that is not an ASSL-specified message or use
alternative mechanism of communication. Thus, for the needs of the self-protecting mechanism,
we specified two communication protocols – at the ASIP tier and at the AEIP tier (this is nested
in the AE specification structure) (see Section 2.1). Please refer to Appendix B for a complete
specification of both protocols.
At the ASIP tier, we specified a single public message (called publicMessage), a single se-
quential bidirectional public communication channel (called public-Link), and two public com-
munication functions; specifically receivePublicMessages and sendPublicMessa-ges. They
are specified to receive and send public messages over the public channel. Here any message
sent or received must be an instance of the ASSL-specified publicMessage. The latter has an
embedded Proxy-Certificate parameter specified to carry the digital signature of the mes-
sage sender (see Appendix B). This parameter plays a key role in the self-protecting behavior
of ADMARF . Every message sender must complete this parameter with its proxy certificate
before sending the message or the latter will be discarded by the system.
Moreover, the mentioned communication functions (receivePublicMessages and sendPublicMessages)
are the only ones specified in the entire AS able to process instances of the publicMessage ASSL
message. Thus, to process such a message both functions are equipped with a conditional clause
to check if the message is secure (see Figure 11).
Figure 11 shows the receivePublicMessages communication function. As is depicted, in
order to send a public message the thereIsInsecurePublicMessage metric (see Appendix B)
must be valid. The latter is updated by the self-protecting policy and is considered invalid (its
operational evaluation returns FALSE [25]) if the public message to be received is insecure.
Note that the specification of the AEIP tier is identical to that of the ASIP tier (see Ap-
pendix B), but deals with private messages [25], i.e., external entities cannot send or receive
such messages.
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//receive public messages if the message is secure
FUNCTION receivePublicMessages {
DOES {
IF ( AS.METRICS.thereIsInsecurePublicMessage ) THEN
MESSAGES.publicMessage << CHANNELS.publicLink
END
}
}
Figure 11: ASSL Specification of receivePublicMessages
SELF_PROTECTING {
// a new incoming message has been detected
FLUENT inSecurityCheck {
INITIATED_BY { EVENTS.publicMessageIsComing }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.publicMessageSecure,
EVENTS.publicMessageInsecure }
}
MAPPING {
CONDITIONS { inSecurityCheck }
DO_ACTIONS { ACTIONS.checkPublicMessage }
}
}
Figure 12: AS Tier SELF PROTECTING Policy
3.2.2 AS Tier Specification for Self-Protection
To protect the AS from insecure public messages we specified a self-management policy that
handles the verification of any incoming public message. Thus, at this tier we specify a SELF_
PROTECTING policy (one of the four self-CHOP policies [13]) to ensure protection from insecure
public messages. Here we specified a single fluent mapped to an action via a mapping clause
(see Figure 12).
The inSecurityCheck fluent is initiated by a pub-licMessageIsComing event and is termi-
nated by one of the events, such as publicMessageSecure or public-MessageInsecure. Here
the inSecurityCheck fluent is activated when an instance of the ASIP-specified publicMessage
is sent to a recipient in the AS. Recall that any public message to be sent to a system recip-
ient (e.g., a DMARF node) must be an instance of the ASSL publicMessage message (see
Section 3.2.1). Therefore, in our specification model, the publicMessageSecure event will be
activated anytime when a publicMessage is about to be received by the AS (by a recipient in
that AS).
Figure 13 presents the specification of all the three events used to initiate and termi-
nate the inSecurity-Check fluent. As it is depicted, both publicMessageIn- secure and
publicMessageSecure are prompted when thereIsInsecurePublicMessage’s value has changed.
Special GUARDS are specified to prevent those events be prompted when that metric is valid or
not valid respectively [25]. The corresponding metric thereIsIn-securePublicMessage ac-
cepts only Boolean values and is valid when it holds FALSE. The same metric is set to TRUE or
FALSE by the checkPublicMessage action. Here the metric is set to TRUE anytime when a new
public insecure message has been discovered (see Appendix B).
The checkPublicMessage action is mapped to the inSecurityCheck fluent (see Figure 12).
Here this action is performed anytime when the AS enters in a security check state (determined
by the inSecurityCheck fluent). This action is intended to check how secure is the incoming
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EVENTS { //these events are used in the fluents specification
EVENT publicMessageIsComing {
ACTIVATION { SENT { ASIP.MESSAGES.publicMessage } }
}
EVENT publicMessageInsecure {
GUARDS { NOT METRICS.thereIsInsecurePublicMessage }
ACTIVATION {
CHANGED { METRICS.thereIsInsecurePublicMessage } }
}
EVENT publicMessageSecure {
GUARDS { METRICS.thereIsInsecurePublicMessage }
ACTIVATION {
CHANGED { METRICS.thereIsInsecurePublicMessage } }
}
} // EVENTS
Figure 13: AS Tier Events
senderIdentified = false;
FOREACH member in AES {
IF ( NOT senderIdentified ) THEN
senderIdentified =
call member.ACTIONS.checkSenderCertificate
(ASIP.MESSAGES.publicMessage.senderSignature)
END
};
IF NOT senderIdentified THEN
// makes the metric invalid and thus, triggers the attached
// event and blocks all the operations with public messages
set METRICS.thereIsInsecurePublicMessage.VALUE = true
END
Figure 14: AS checkPublicMessage Action – Partial Specification
publicMessage, which triggers the self-protecting policy by prompting the publicMessageIs-
Coming event (see Figure 13). To do that, the checkPub-licMessage action calls for each AE
in the AS a check-SenderCertificate action that must be specified in each AE (DMARF
stage) (see Figure 14).
The checkSenderCertificate action returns TRUE if the publicMessage carries a valid dig-
ital signature (see Appendix B), i.e., the message is sent by a trusted sender (DMARF node). As
depicted by Figure 14, if one of the AE returns TRUE, then the publicMessage is considered se-
cure; otherwise, it is considered insecure. If the message is insecure the thereIsInsecurePublic-
Message metric is set to TRUE, which blocks the IO operations over this message (see Sec-
tion 3.2.1 and Appendix B).
3.2.3 AE Tier Specification for Self-Protection
At this tier we specify the self-protecting mechanism for private messages. Thus, for each AE
(DMARF stage) we specify a SELF_PROTECTING self-management policy identical to the same
policy specified at the AS tier (see Section 3.2.2). Note that this policy deals with private
messages specified at the AEIP tier (the AE’s private interaction protocol – see Appendix B).
Therefore, similarly to the same policy specified for the AS tier, the AE-level SELF_PROTECTING
policy is specified with a single inSecurityCheck fluent mapped to a checkPrivateMessage
action. The inSecurity-Check fluent is initiated by the privateMessageIsCo-mming event
and terminated by the privateMessageIs-Secure event or by the privateMessageSecure
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MANAGED_ELEMENTS {
MANAGED_ELEMENT STAGE_ME {
// checks if a node certificate is valid
INTERFACE_FUNCTION checkNodeCertificate {
PARAMETERS { ProxyCertificate theCertificate }
RETURNS { Boolean }
}
}
}
Figure 15: AE STAGE ME Managed Element
event. These events are similar to their homologous events specified at the AS tier (see
Section 3.2.2), but dealing with the AEIP-specified privateMessage message and with the
thereIsInsecurePrivateMessage metric at the AE-level (see Appendix B).
To perform the security checks of incoming private messages, the checkPrivateMessage
action invokes the checkSenderCertificate action (recall that the same action is called by
the checkPublicMessage action to check public messages – see Section 3.2.2). Internally, the
checkSenderCertificate action calls a managed element interface function specified at the
AEIP protocol to check proxy certificates (see Figure 15).
Recall (see Section 2.1) that managed elements provide special interface functions to control
the DMARF system. Hence, as depicted by Figure 15, we expect the DMARF stage to verify
whether a specific proxy certificate is valid and to return TRUE or FALSE. DMARF does that
through the Java Data Security Framework (JDSF) [9, 11].
3.3 ASSL Self-Optimization Model for DMARF
The two major functional requirements applicable to large DMARF installations related to
self-optimization are outlined below:
Training set classification data replication. A DMARF-based system may do a lot of
multimedia data processing and number crunching throughout the pipeline. The bulk of I/O-
bound data processing falls on the sample loading stage and the classification stage. The
preprocessing, feature extraction, and classification stages also do a lot of CPU-bound number
crunching, matrix operations, and other potentially heavy computations. The stand-alone
local MARF instance employs dynamic programming to cache intermediate results, usually as
feature vectors, inverse co-variance matrices, and other array-like data. A lot of this data is
absorbed by the classification stages. In the case of the DMARF, such data may end up being
stored on different hosts that run the classification service potentially causing re-computation
of the already computed data on other classification host that did a similar evaluation already.
Thus, the classification stage nodes need to communicate to exchange the data they have lazily
acquired among all the classification members. Such data mirroring/replication would optimize
a lot of computational effort on the end nodes.
Dynamic communication protocol selection. Additional aspect of self-optimization is
automatic selection of the available most efficient communication protocol. E.g., if DMARF
initially uses WebServices XML-RPC and later discovers all of its nodes can also communicate
using say Java RMI, they can switch to that as their default protocol in order to avoid marshal-
ing and de-marshaling heavy SOAP XML messages that are always a subject of a big overhead
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SELF_OPTIMIZING {
// DMARF enters in the Classification Stage
FLUENT inClassificationStage {
INITIATED_BY { EVENTS.enteringClassificationStage }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.optimizationSucceeded,
EVENTS.optimizationNotSucceeded }
}
MAPPING {
CONDITIONS { inClassificationStage }
DO_ACTIONS { ACTIONS.runGlobalOptimization }
}
}
Figure 16: AS Tier SELF OPTIMIZING Policy
even in the compressed form.
Here, the DMARF Classification stage is augmented with a self-optimizing autonomic policy.
We used ASSL to specify this policy and generate implementation for the same. Appendix C
presents a partial specification of the ASSL self-optimization model for ADMARF. As specified,
the autonomic behavior is encoded in a special ASSL construct denoted as SELF_OPTIMIZING
policy. The latter is specified at two levels - the global AS-tier level and the level of single AE
(the AE-tier). The algorithm behind is described by the following elements:
• Any time when ADMARF enters in the Classification stage, a self-optimization behavior
takes place.
• The Classification stage itself forces the stage nodes synchronize their latest cached results.
Here each node is asked to get the results of the other nodes.
• Before proceeding with the problem computation, each stage node strives to adapt to the
most efficient currently available communication protocol.
The following sections describe the ASSL specification of the self-optimization algorithm
revealed here.
3.3.1 AS Tier Specification for Self-Optimization
At this tier we specify a system-level SELF_OPTIMIZING policy and the actions and events
supporting that policy. As was mentioned, ASSL supports policy specification with special
constructs called fluents and mappings [25]. Whereas the former are special states with con-
ditional duration, the latter map actions to be executed when the system enters in such a
state.
Figure 16 depicts the AS-tier specification of the SELF_OPTIMIZING policy. As we see
the policy is triggered when the special fluent inClassificationStage is initiated. Here
when ADMARF enters the Classification stage in its pipeline, an AS-level enteringClassi-
ficationStage event is prompted to initiate the corresponding inClassificationStage flu-
ent.
Further, this fluent is mapped to an AS-level run-GlobalOptimization action (see Ap-
pendix C). This action iterates over all the Classification stage nodes specified as distinct AEs
(see Section 3.3.2) and calls for each node a special AE-level synchronizeResults action (see
Appendix C). In case of exception, the optimizati-onNotSucceeded event is issued; else the
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optimizati-onSucceeded event is issued. Both events terminate the inClassificationStage
fluent, and consecutively ADMARF exits the SELF_OPTIMIZING policy.
To distinguish the AEs from the other AEs in ADMARF, we specified the architecture
topology of the system. For this we used the ASARCHITECTURE ASSL construct [25]. Appendix C
presents the specification of the ADMARF architecture topology. Note that this is a partial
specification depicting only two AEs. The full ASARCHITECTURE specification includes all the
AEs of ADMARF. As depicted, we specified a special group of AEs called CLASSF_STAGE
with members all the AEs representing the Classification stage nodes. This group allows the
runGlobalOptimization action iterates over the stage nodes.
3.3.2 AE Tier Specification for Self-Optimization
At this tier we specified the SELF_OPTIMIZING policy for the Classification stage nodes. Here we
specified for every node a distinct AE. (see Appendix C) presents the partial specification of two
AEs, each representing a single node of the Specification stage. At this level, self-optimization
concentrates on adapting the single nodes to the most efficient communication protocol. Similar
to the AS-level policy specification (see Section 3.3.1), an inCPAdaptation fluent is specified
to trigger such adaptation when ADMARF enters in the Specification stage. This fluent is
initiated by the AS-level enteringClassificationStage event.
The same fluent is mapped to an adaptCP action to perform the needed adaptation. This
action is specified as IMPL, i.e., requiring further implementation [25]. In ASSL, we specify IMPL
actions to hide complexity via abstraction. Here, the adaptCP action is a complex structure,
which explanation is beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, we abstracted the specification
of this action (through IMPL) and provided only the prerequisite guard conditions and prompted
events.
4 Conclusion
In this article, we have presented ASSL specification models for autonomic features of AD-
MARF. To develop these features, we devised algorithms with ASSL for the pipelined stages of
the DMARF’s pattern recognition pipeline. The autonomic features were specified as special
self-managing policies for self-healing, self-protecting, and self-optimizing in ADMARF. The
ADMARF system (upon completion of the open-source implementation) will be able to fully
function in autonomous environments, be those on the Internet, large multimedia processing
farms, robotic spacecraft that do their own analysis, or simply even pattern-recognition research
groups that can rely more on the availability of their systems that run for multiple days, unat-
tended. Although not a fully complete specification model for ADMARF, we have attempted
to provide didactic evidence of how ASSL can help us achieve desired automicity in DMARF.
Future work is concerned with further ADMARF development by including new autonomic
features. For example, together with the full implementation and testing of the presented
specification models, we intend to develop autonomic features covering the self-configuration
aspects of ADMARF. These will help to construct an intelligent ADMARF system able to
react automatically to dynamic requirements by finding possible solutions and applying those
with no human interaction.
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A ASSL Specification of DMARF Self-Healing
What follows is the complete initial ASSL specification of the self-healing aspect for the DMARF’s
pipeline stages [24].
// ASSL self-healing specification model for DMARF
AS DMARF {
TYPES { DMARFNode }
ASSLO {
SLO performance {
FOREACH member in AES {
member.AESLO.performance
}
}
}
ASSELF_MANAGEMENT {
SELF_HEALING {
// a performance problem has been detected
FLUENT inLowPerformance {
INITIATED_BY { EVENTS.lowPerformanceDetected }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.performanceNormalized, EVENTS.performanceNormFailed }
}
MAPPING {
CONDITIONS { inLowPerformance }
DO_ACTIONS { ACTIONS.startSelfHealing }
}
}
} // ASSELF_MANAGEMENT
ACTIONS {
ACTION IMPL startSelfHealing {
GUARDS { ASSELF_MANAGEMENT.SELF_HEALING.inLowPerformance }
TRIGGERS {
IF NOT AES.STAGE_AE.AESLO.performance THEN
AES.STAGE_AE.EVENTS.mustDoSelfHealing
END
}
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}
} // ACTIONS
EVENTS { // these events are used in the fluents specification
EVENT lowPerformanceDetected { ACTIVATION { DEGRADED { ASSLO.performance} } }
EVENT performanceNormalized { ACTIVATION { NORMALIZED { ASSLO.performance} } }
EVENT performanceNormFailed { ACTIVATION { OCCURRED { AES.STAGE_AE.EVENTS.selfHealingFailed } } }
} // EVENTS
} // AS DMARF
AES {
AE STAGE_AE {
VARS { DMARFNode nodeToRecover }
AESLO {
SLO performance {
METRICS.numberOfFailedNodes
AND
METRICS.numberOfProblematicNodes
}
}
AESELF_MANAGEMENT {
SELF_HEALING {
FLUENT inActiveSelfHealing {
INITIATED_BY { EVENTS.mustDoSelfHealing }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.selfHealingSuccessful, EVENTS.selfHealingFailed }
}
FLUENT inFailedNodesDetected {
INITIATED_BY { EVENTS.mustSwitchToNodeReplica }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.nodeReplicaStarted, EVENTS.nodeReplicaFailed }
}
FLUENT inProblematicNodesDetected {
INITIATED_BY { EVENTS.mustFixNode }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.nodeFixed, EVENTS.nodeCannotBeFixed }
}
MAPPING {
CONDITIONS { inActiveSelfHealing }
DO_ACTIONS { ACTIONS.analyzeProblem }
}
MAPPING {
CONDITIONS { inFailedNodesDetected }
DO_ACTIONS { ACTIONS.startReplicaNode }
}
MAPPING {
CONDITIONS { inProblematicNodesDetected }
DO_ACTIONS { ACTIONS.fixProblematicNode }
}
}
} // AESELF_MANAGEMENT
AEIP {
MANAGED_ELEMENTS {
MANAGED_ELEMENT STAGE_ME {
INTERFACE_FUNCTION countFailedNodes {
RETURNS { Integer }
}
INTERFACE_FUNCTION countProblematicNodes {
RETURNS { Integer }
}
// returns the next failed node
INTERFACE_FUNCTION getFailedNode {
RETURNS { DMARFNode }
}
// returns the next problematic node
INTERFACE_FUNCTION getProblematicNode {
RETURNS { DMARFNode }
}
// runs the replica of a failed nodee
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INTERFACE_FUNCTION runNodeReplica {
PARAMETERS { DMARFNode node }
ONERR_TRIGGERS { EVENTS.nodeReplicaFailed }
}
// recovers a problematic node
INTERFACE_FUNCTION recoverNode {
PARAMETERS { DMARFNode node }
ONERR_TRIGGERS { EVENTS.nodeCannotBeFixed }
}
}
}
} // AEIP
ACTIONS {
ACTION analyzeProblem {
GUARDS { AESELF_MANAGEMENT.SELF_HEALING.inActiveSelfHealing }
VARS { BOOLEAN failed }
DOES {
IF METRICS.numberOfFailedNodes THEN
AES.STAGE_AE.nodeToRecover = call AEIP.MANAGED_ELEMENTS.STAGE_ME.getFailedNode;
failed = TRUE
END
ELSE
AES.STAGE_AE.nodeToRecover = call AEIP.MANAGED_ELEMENTS.STAGE_ME.getProblematicNode;
failed = FALSE
END
}
TRIGGERS {
IF failed THEN EVENTS.mustSwitchToNodeReplica END
ELSE EVENTS.mustFixNode END
}
ONERR_TRIGGERS { EVENTS.selfHealingFailed }
}
ACTION startReplicaNode {
GUARDS { AESELF_MANAGEMENT.SELF_HEALING.inFailedNodesDetected }
DOES { call AEIP.MANAGED_ELEMENTS.STAGE_ME.runNodeReplica(AES.STAGE_AE.nodeToRecover) }
TRIGGERS { EVENTS.nodeReplicaStarted }
}
ACTION fixProblematicNode {
GUARDS { AESELF_MANAGEMENT.SELF_HEALING.inProblematicNodesDetected }
DOES { call AEIP.MANAGED_ELEMENTS.STAGE_ME.recoverNode(AES.STAGE_AE.nodeToRecover) }
TRIGGERS { EVENTS.nodeFixed}
}
} // ACTIONS
EVENTS {
EVENT mustDoSelfHealing { }
EVENT selfHealingSuccessful {
ACTIVATION {
OCCURRED { EVENTS.nodeReplicaStarted }
OR
OCCURRED { EVENTS.nodeFixed }
}
}
EVENT selfHealingFailed {
ACTIVATION {
OCCURRED { EVENTS.nodeReplicaFailed }
}
}
EVENT mustSwitchToNodeReplica {
ACTIVATION {
OCCURRED { EVENTS.nodeCannotBeFixed }
}
}
EVENT nodeReplicaStarted { }
EVENT nodeReplicaFailed { }
EVENT mustFixNode { }
EVENT nodeFixed { }
EVENT nodeCannotBeFixed { }
} // EVENTS
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METRICS {
// increments when a failed node has been discovered
METRIC numberOfFailedNodes {
METRIC_TYPE { RESOURCE }
METRIC_SOURCE { AEIP.MANAGED_ELEMENTS.STAGE_ME.countFailedNodes }
DESCRIPTION {"counts failed nodes in the MARF stage"}
VALUE { 0 }
THRESHOLD_CLASS { Integer [0] } // valid only when holding 0 value
}
// increments when a problematic node has been discovered
METRIC numberOfProblematicNodes {
METRIC_TYPE { RESOURCE }
METRIC_SOURCE { AEIP.MANAGED_ELEMENTS.STAGE_ME.countProblematicNodes }
DESCRIPTION {"counts nodes with problems in the MARF stage"}
VALUE { 0 }
THRESHOLD_CLASS { Integer [0] } // valid only when holding 0 value
}
}
}
}
B ASSL Code Specification for DMARF Self-Protection
What follows is the complete initial ASSL specification of the self-protection aspect for the
DMARF’s pipeline stages [12].
// ASSL self-protecting specification model for DMARF
AS DMARF {
TYPES { ProxyCertificate }
ASSELF_MANAGEMENT {
// if a private message is detected as being insecure then
// ignore it - the AE cannot neither receive nor resend it
SELF_PROTECTING {
// a new incoming message has been detected
FLUENT inSecurityCheck {
INITIATED_BY { EVENTS.publicMessageIsComing }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.publicMessageSecure,
EVENTS.publicMessageInsecure }
}
MAPPING {
CONDITIONS { inSecurityCheck }
DO_ACTIONS { ACTIONS.checkPublicMessage }
}
}
} // ASSELF_MANAGEMENT
ACTIONS {
ACTION checkPublicMessage {
GUARDS { ASSELF_MANAGEMENT.SELF_PROTECTING.inSecurityCheck }
VARS { Boolean senderIdentified }
DOES {
senderIdentified = false;
FOREACH member in AES {
IF ( NOT senderIdentified ) THEN
senderIdentified =
call member.ACTIONS.checkSenderCertificate
(ASIP.MESSAGES.publicMessage.senderSignature)
END
};
IF NOT senderIdentified THEN
// makes the metric invalid and thus, triggers the attached event
// and blocks all the operations with public messages
set METRICS.thereIsInsecurePublicMessage.VALUE = true
END
ELSE
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// makes the metric valid and thus, triggers the attached event
// and unblocks all the operations with public messages
set METRICS.thereIsInsecurePublicMessage.VALUE = false
END
}
ONERR_DOES {
// if error then treat the message as insecure
set METRICS.thereIsInsecurePublicMessage.VALUE = true
}
}
} // ACTIONS
EVENTS { // these events are used in the fluents specification
EVENT publicMessageIsComing {
ACTIVATION { SENT { ASIP.MESSAGES.publicMessage } }
}
EVENT publicMessageInsecure {
GUARDS { NOT METRICS.thereIsInsecurePublicMessage }
ACTIVATION { CHANGED { METRICS.thereIsInsecurePublicMessage } }
}
EVENT publicMessageSecure {
GUARDS { METRICS.thereIsInsecurePublicMessage }
ACTIVATION { CHANGED { METRICS.thereIsInsecurePublicMessage } }
}
} // EVENTS
METRICS {
// set to true when a new public insecure message
// has been discovered
METRIC thereIsInsecurePublicMessage {
METRIC_TYPE { QUALITY }
DESCRIPTION {"detects an insecure message in the AE"}
VALUE { false }
// valid only when holding false value
THRESHOLD_CLASS { Boolean [false] }
}
}
} // AS DMARF
ASIP {
MESSAGES {
MESSAGE publicMessage {
SENDER { ANY }
RECEIVER { AES.STAGE_AE }
MSG_TYPE { TEXT }
PARAMETERS { ProxyCertificate senderSignature }
}
}
CHANNELS {
CHANNEL publicLink {
ACCEPTS { MESSAGES.publicMessage }
ACCESS { SEQUENTIAL }
DIRECTION { INOUT }
}
}
FUNCTIONS {
//receive public messages if the message is secure
FUNCTION receivePublicMessages {
DOES {
IF ( AS.METRICS.thereIsInsecurePublicMessage ) THEN
MESSAGES.publicMessage << CHANNELS.publicLink
END
}
}
//send public messages if the message is secure
FUNCTION sendPublicMessages {
DOES {
IF ( AS.METRICS.thereIsInsecurePublicMessage ) THEN
MESSAGES.publicMessage >> CHANNELS.publicLink
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END
}
}
}
}
AES {
AE STAGE_AE {
AESELF_MANAGEMENT {
// if a private message is detected as being insecure then
// ignore it - the AE cannot neither receive nor resend it
SELF_PROTECTING {
FLUENT inSecurityCheck {
INITIATED_BY { EVENTS.privateMessageIsComming }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.privateMessageSecure,
EVENTS.privateMessageInsecure }
}
MAPPING {
CONDITIONS { inSecurityCheck }
DO_ACTIONS { ACTIONS.checkPrivateMessage }
}
}
} // AESELF_MANAGEMENT
AEIP {
MESSAGES {
MESSAGE privateMessage {
SENDER { ANY }
RECEIVER { AES.STAGE_AE }
MSG_TYPE { TEXT }
PARAMETERS { ProxyCertificate senderSignature}
}
}
CHANNELS {
CHANNEL privateLink {
ACCEPTS { AEIP.MESSAGES.privateMessage }
ACCESS { SEQUENTIAL }
DIRECTION { INOUT }
}
}
FUNCTIONS {
//receive private messages if the message is secure
FUNCTION receivePrivateMessages {
DOES {
IF ( AES.STAGE_AE.METRICS.thereIsInsecurePrivateMessage ) THEN
AEIP.MESSAGES.privateMessage << AEIP.CHANNELS.privateLink
END
}
}
//send private messages if the message is secure
FUNCTION sendPrivateMessages {
DOES {
IF ( AES.STAGE_AE.METRICS.thereIsInsecurePrivateMessage ) THEN
AEIP.MESSAGES.privateMessage >> AEIP.CHANNELS.privateLink
END
}
}
}
MANAGED_ELEMENTS {
MANAGED_ELEMENT STAGE_ME {
// checks if a node certificate is valid
INTERFACE_FUNCTION checkNodeCertificate {
PARAMETERS { ProxyCertificate theCertificate }
RETURNS { Boolean }
}
}
}
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} // AEIP
ACTIONS {
ACTION checkSenderCertificate {
PARAMETERS { ProxyCertificate theCertificate }
RETURNS { Boolean }
VARS { Boolean found }
DOES {
found = call AEIP.MANAGED_ELEMENTS.STAGE_ME.checkNodeCertificate
(theCertificate);
return found
}
}
ACTION checkPrivateMessage {
GUARDS { AESELF_MANAGEMENT.SELF_PROTECTING.inSecurityCheck }
VARS { Boolean senderIdentified }
DOES {
senderIdentified = call ACTIONS.checkSenderCertificate
( AEIP.MESSAGES.privateMessage.senderSignature );
IF NOT senderIdentified THEN
// makes the metric invalid and thus, triggers the attached event
// and blocks all the operations with private messages
set METRICS.thereIsInsecurePrivateMessage.VALUE = true
END
ELSE
// makes the metric valid and thus, triggers the attached event
// and unblocks all the operations with private messages
set METRICS.thereIsInsecurePrivateMessage.VALUE = false
END
}
ONERR_DOES {
// if error then treat the message as insecure
set METRICS.thereIsInsecurePrivateMessage.VALUE = true
}
}
} // ACTIONS
EVENTS {
EVENT privateMessageIsComming {
ACTIVATION { SENT { AEIP.MESSAGES.privateMessage } }
}
EVENT privateMessageInsecure {
GUARDS { NOT METRICS.thereIsInsecurePrivateMessage }
ACTIVATION { CHANGED { METRICS.thereIsInsecurePrivateMessage } }
}
EVENT privateMessageSecure {
GUARDS { METRICS.thereIsInsecurePrivateMessage }
ACTIVATION { CHANGED { METRICS.thereIsInsecurePrivateMessage } }
}
} // EVENTS
METRICS {
// set to true when an insecure private message is discovered
METRIC thereIsInsecurePrivateMessage {
METRIC_TYPE { QUALITY }
DESCRIPTION {"detects an insecure message in the AE"}
VALUE { false }
// valid only when holding false value
THRESHOLD_CLASS { Boolean [false] }
}
}
}
}
C ASSL Code Specification for DMARF Self-Optimization
What follows is the complete initial ASSL specification of the self-optimization aspect for the
DMARF’s pipeline stages [23].
26
Autonomic Specification of Pattern-Recognition Systems with ASSL Vassev and Mokhov
// ASSL self-optimization specification model for DMARF
AS DMARF {
ASSELF_MANAGEMENT {
// DMARF strives to optimize by synchronizing cached
// results before starting with the Classification Stage
SELF_OPTIMIZING {
// DMARF enters in the Classification Stage
FLUENT inClassificationStage {
INITIATED_BY { EVENTS.enteringClassificationStage }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.optimizationSucceeded,
EVENTS.optimizationNotSucceeded }
}
MAPPING {
CONDITIONS { inClassificationStage }
DO_ACTIONS { ACTIONS.runGlobalOptimization }
}
}
} // ASSELF_MANAGEMENT
ASARCHITECTURE {
AELIST {AES.CLASSF_STAGE_NODE_1, AES.CLASSF_STAGE_NODE_2}
DIRECT_DEPENDENCIES {
DEPENDENCY AES.CLASSF_STAGE_NODE_1 { AES.CLASSF_STAGE_NODE_2 }
DEPENDENCY AES.CLASSF_STAGE_NODE_2 { AES.CLASSF_STAGE_NODE_1 }
}
GROUPS {
GROUP CLASSF_STAGE {
MEMBERS { AES.CLASSF_STAGE_NODE_1, AES.CLASSF_STAGE_NODE_2 }
}
}
}
ACTIONS {
ACTION runGlobalOptimization {
GUARDS { ASSELF_MANAGEMENT.SELF_OPTIMIZING.inClassificationStage }
DOES {
FOREACH member IN ASARCHITECTURE.GROUPS.CLASSF_STAGE.MEMBERS {
call IMPL member.ACTIONS.synchronizeResults
}
}
TRIGGERS {
EVENTS.optimizationSucceeded
}
ONERR_TRIGGERS {
// if error then report unsuccessful optimization
EVENTS.optimizationNotSucceeded
}
}
} // ACTIONS
EVENTS { // these events are used in the fluents specification
EVENT enteringClassificationStage { }
EVENT optimizationSucceeded { }
EVENT optimizationNotSucceeded { }
} // EVENTS
} // AS DMARF
AES {
AE CLASSF_STAGE_NODE_1 {
AESELF_MANAGEMENT {
SELF_OPTIMIZING {
FLUENT inCPAdaptation {
INITIATED_BY { AS.EVENTS.enteringClassificationStage }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.cpAdaptationSucceeded,
EVENTS.cpAdaptationNotSucceeded }
}
MAPPING {
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CONDITIONS { inCPAdaptation }
DO_ACTIONS { ACTIONS.adaptCP }
}
}
}
ACTIONS {
ACTION IMPL synchronizeResults {
GUARDS { AS.ASSELF_MANAGEMENT.SELF_OPTIMIZING.
inClassificationStage
}
}
ACTION IMPL adaptCP {
GUARDS { AESELF_MANAGEMENT.SELF_OPTIMIZING.inCPAdaptation }
TRIGGERS { EVENTS.cpAdaptationSucceeded }
ONERR_TRIGGERS { EVENTS.cpAdaptationNotSucceeded }
}
} // ACTIONS
EVENTS { // these events are used in the fluents specification
EVENT cpAdaptationSucceeded { }
EVENT cpAdaptationNotSucceeded { }
} // EVENTS
}
AE CLASSF_STAGE_NODE_2 {
AESELF_MANAGEMENT {
SELF_OPTIMIZING {
FLUENT inCPAdaptation {
INITIATED_BY { AS.EVENTS.enteringClassificationStage }
TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.cpAdaptationSucceeded,
EVENTS.cpAdaptationNotSucceeded }
}
MAPPING {
CONDITIONS { inCPAdaptation }
DO_ACTIONS { ACTIONS.adaptCP }
}
}
}
ACTIONS {
ACTION IMPL synchronizeResults {
GUARDS { AS.ASSELF_MANAGEMENT.SELF_OPTIMIZING.
inClassificationStage
}
}
ACTION IMPL adaptCP {
GUARDS { AESELF_MANAGEMENT.SELF_OPTIMIZING.inCPAdaptation }
TRIGGERS { EVENTS.cpAdaptationSucceeded }
ONERR_TRIGGERS { EVENTS.cpAdaptationNotSucceeded }
}
} // ACTIONS
EVENTS { // these events are used in the fluents specification
EVENT cpAdaptationSucceeded { }
EVENT cpAdaptationNotSucceeded { }
} // EVENTS}
}
}
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